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CASE NOTES
Copyright—Infringement—Fraudulent Material Copyrightable-
Bekher v. Tarbox. *'—Plaintiff and defendant are both engaged in
the business of publishing handicapping systems for betting on horse
races. The plaintiffs' systems are each published in a separate publi-
cation, six of which are involved in the present action. Defendant
periodically published a magazine containing reprints of various
betting system formulations, including the plaintiffs'. Plaintiff
brought suit for infringement of his copyrights, trademarks and
trade names. The district court below found the copyright of five of
the six reprints valid and infringed, and awarded plaintiff injunctive
relief and damages. 2 The district court refused to enforce the
copyright on the sixth publication because the composition itself and
its attendant advertising were found to be designed to deceive the
public by misrepresenting the origin of the composition as the prod-
uct of computer research and analysis when in fact no computer was
used. 3 Defendants appealed the decision with respect to the first five
publications claiming that the works were not entitled to copyright
protection because they fraudulently represented to the public that
users of the system could predict the winners of horse races. 4 Plain-
tiffs cross-appealed on the denial of copyright protection to
their sixth publication. 5 The court of appeals, affirming in part, 6 re-
versed and remanded in part, HELD: False and fraudulent material
is entitled to copyright protection and the clean hands doctrine
does not preclude such protection.'
This note will consider the clean hands doctrine as a defense to
copyright infringement actions. It will be submitted that the court in
Belcher confused the clean hands doctrine with an infringement
defense based on the constitutional limitations of the Copyright
Clause, and that applying the latter unnecessarily led to its rejection
of the former. It will be argued that the inquiry into the content of
copyrighted work when applying the clean hands doctrine is much
more limited than the inquiry required when the work is judged
under the constitutional limitation.
There are two ways in which a court can deny copyright
protection to a work because of its content. The first is based on a
constitutional theory that a copyright is a privilege granted to au-
thors for protection of works which promote the sciences and useful
* A slightly different version of this Note was submitted to the 1974 National Nathan
Burkan Memorial Copyright Competition.
486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973).
2
 Belcher v. Tarbox, Civil No. 68-279-T, at 7 (S.D. Cal., Oct. 28, 1971).
3 Id. at 8.
486 F.2d at 1087.
5 Id. at 1089.





arts. 8 The second is based on the equitable principle that he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. 9 The equitable
principle is applicable to copyright infringement actions because the
Copyright Actl° provides that in granting relief to vindicate rights
under the Act, a court shall grant injunctions according to the
course and principles of courts of equity." The court in Belcher
refused to follow precedent in the area 12 and apply the clean hands
doctrine to this case because it believed that to do so would require
the court to "pass 'upon the or falsity, the soundness or un-
soundness of the views embodied in a copyrighted work,"' 3 and it
perceived that the theological, philosophical, economic and scientific
problems that would confront the court if it undertook that task
would be staggering." But such scrutiny of the substance of a
publication is required far less by the clean hands doctrine than by
the constitutional theory that the copyright clause protects only
"worthwhile" creative effort, a theory to which the Belcher court
did not address itself. This confusion may have resulted in the
rejection of a valuable equitable doctrine which courts have used
occasionally to invalidate copyrights in works which are detrimental
to the public interest and an abuse of the privilege of copyright
protection."
The court's fear of the inquiry into the substantive merit of a
publication appears historically well founded. For years the con-
stitutional theory was used to deny copyright protection to works
which the courts found to be seditious, libelous, obscene, indecent
and immoral.' 6 The practice was based on the constitutional man-
date that works protected by copyright should promote the sciences
and useful arts, and on a correlative assumption that there is no
right to publish inherent in such works and therefore no property
right in the work that should be protected." The objection of the
courts was not to the misconduct of the plaintiff, as was the case
where the equitable theory applied, but rather to the work itself; the
ideas were simply not the subject of ownership.18 
" U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 8: "Congress shall have Power	 . To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . ."
9 See Primeau v. Granfteld, 193 F. 911, 912 (2d Cir. 1911).
1 ° 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
11 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1970).
12 See text at notes 46-54 infra.
11 486 F.2d at 1088.
19 Id.
15 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Stone &
McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915); Krauss v. Joseph R. Peebles
Sons' Co., 58 F. 585 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1893).
1 ' See Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903); Broder v. Zeno Mauvais
Music Co., 88 F. 74 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898).
17 See Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1893). See also Chafee,
Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1065, 1068 (1949); Note, 21 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 71, 72 (1954).
1 " See, e.g., Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 172 Eng. Rep. 75, 77-78 (K.B. 1826).
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An example of the use of the constitutional theory illustrating
the Belcher court's fear of such substantive scrutiny is Martinetti v.
Maguire, 19
 which held that a play, The Black Crook, was a compo-
sition the production of which would not promote the progress of
science and useful arts and therefore not entitled to copyright pro-
tection. 2° The court criticized the work as a spectacle which "pan-
ders to a prurient curiosity or an obscene imagination by the very
questionable exhibitions and attitudes of the female person" 21
 and
claimed that to call such a spectacle a "dramatic composition" was
an abuse of language and an insult to the genius of English drama. 22
The defendant in Martinetti had produced what the court conceded
to be virtually an identical play entitled The Black Rook, and yet the
court refused protection to the plaintiff because of the content of his
original play.
The notion that courts should inspect and censor work for
which protection is sought and deny relief if it does not conform to
the judge's notions of propriety in religion or morality has been
criticized throughout the history of its application. 23
The fear of judicial inquiry into the morality, philosophy and
theology of a publication is not a new one, nor is it one which
should be ignored. But the other alternative—the evocation of the
clean hands doctrine—does not require any such inquiry or judg-
ment by the courts. In the Belcher case the issue before the court
was not a moral, but a legal one; determination of what is fraudu-
lent is based on the law of torts, not on a judge's personal beliefs.
Fraud and misrepresentation has always been conduct for which the
clean hands doctrine is applied without the necessity of assessing the
merit of a particular work. 24
The clean hands doctrine has had a murky and somewhat
distorted history in copyright law. Traditionally, a clean hands
defense to an infringement action was accepted only if the alleged
misconduct of the plaintiff occurred while dealing with the subject
matter of the suit and the defendant himself was specially harmed. 25
The first condition was easily met in copyright cases; the second
presented the courts with a problem, since the typical defendants in
infringement actions—competitors of a publisher—could less easily
demonstrate specific harm of fraudulent publication than could, for
example, consumers of the fraudulent publication. Thus, the clean
19
 16 F. Cas. 920 (No. 9173) (C.C.D. Cal. 1867).
20
 Id. at 923.
21
 Id. at 922.
" Id.
23
 See, e.g., J. Milton, Areopagitica 48, 54 (Arber's Ed. 1868); Rogers, Copyright and
Morals, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 390, 392-94 (1920). See M. Nimmer, Copyright § 3.2, at 6 (1973).
24
 See, e.g., Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 142 F. 919, 925 (6th
Cir. 1906); Fay v. Lambourne, 124 App. Div. 245, 247, 108 N.Y.S. 874, 876 (1908). See
generally, Annot. 4 A.L.R. 44 (1919).
25
 See, e.g., Galbraith v. Devlin, 85 Wash. 482, 490, 148 P. 589, 592 (1915). See
generally, Annot., 4 A.L.R. 44 (1919).
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hands defense was a doctrine which could be relied on infrequently
in copyright infringement actions. 26 However, in Morton Salt Co. v.
G. S. Suppiger Co., 27 the Supreme Court denied relief in a patent
infringement case where the patent was used as a means of restrain-
ing competition. The Court circumvented the strict requirement of
specific harm by pointing out that "[i]t is the adverse effect upon the
public interest of a successful infringement suit . . . which
disqualifies him [plaintiff] to maintain the suit, regardless of whether
the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the
patent."'s The adverse effect on the public in upholding the
copyright has been adverted to by many courts in bringing the clean
hands doctrine into play regardless of lack of harm to the defendant.
In 1893, a federal district court, in Krauss v. Joseph R. Peebles
Sons' Co., 29 denied equitable relief to a plaintiff who claimed in-
fringement of whiskey packaging labels. The court found that the
information on the labels was false and fraudulent and stressed that
the public's reliance on the labels was significant and should be
protected by the denial of equitable relief." And, in International
Biotical Corp. v. Associated Mills, Inc., 31 a federal district court
found that plaintiff's inequitable conduct with respect to its man-
ufacture of infra-red heat lamps and massagers rendered its design
patent and copyrights unenforceable against an infringer. Plaintiff's
copyrighted brochure was found to be misleading and deceptive and
the court invoked protection of the public interest as one reason for
denying copyright protection. 32
Protection of the public interest in denying copyright protection
is a use of the clean hands doctrine in its broadest sense. In
copyright cases, this broad form of the doctrine is not only employed
by many courts to deny protection against infringers, but also pro-
vides them a valuable tool deterring a supposed misuse of the
copyright privilege. In this form, the principle is well stated by the
court in T.B. Harms & Francis, Day & Hunter v. Stern: 33
The interference of the court by injunction being founded
on pure equitable principles, a man who comes to the court
must be able to show that his own conduct in the transac-
tion has been consistent with equity. A book accordingly
which is itself piratical cannot be protected from invasion,
26 See M. Nimmer, Copyright § 149.2, at 664 (1973). Nimmer's position is that the clean
hands defense is recognized only rarely when the plaintiffs transgression is of serious propor-
tions and relates to the subject matter of the infringement action. Id. See generally, Note, The
Misuse Defense in Copyright Actions, 37 N.Y,U.L. Rev. 916 (1962); Note, 21 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 71 (1959).
27 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
28 Id. at 494.
26 58 F. 585 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1893).
1° Id. at 594.
11 239 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. III. 1964).
12 Id. at 516.
33 231 F. 645 (2d Cir. 1916).
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nor will the court protect by injunction a work which is of
an immoral, indecent, seditious or libelous nature, or
which is fraudulent. 34
The major argument against the use of the clean hands doctrine
in copyright infringement actions is that the misconduct or illegality
of the plaintiff involves the court in inquiries which are outside the
scope of the action as outlined in the Copyright Act. 35 The argu-
ment is stated in Vitagraph, Inc. v. Grobaski. 36
 The court, in
rejecting the antitrust defense to a copyright infringement action
noted:
Illegality of a combination cannot be interposed as a de-
fense to suits for infringement of copyrights . . . the general
principle being than these suits are regarded as being based
not upon contract but upon tort. It is said that the fact that
one has entered into some illegal contract does not au-
thorize others to injure him with impunity. 37
The court in Krauss, 38
 however, when faced with a trademark
case 39
 where the court had rejected the clean hands defense by
reasoning similar to that of Grobaski, dismissed such reasoning by
pointing out that the reason relief is refused complainant has no-
thing to do with the defendant's rights or wrongs. 4° Relief was
refused because a court would not protect a fraudulent business of a
plaintiff, however much in the wrong a defendant might be. 4 !
Another major argument against the use of the clean hands
defense in copyright actions, and one by which the Belcher court
was persuaded, is that the denial of equitable relief in the form of an
injunction to a holder of a copyright in a work alleged to be
fraudulent or in some way adverse to public policy is not really in
the public interest at all since it eliminates a restriction on the
circulation of the material and allows it to be reprinted freely. 42
Judge Wallace, in his dissent to the case, answered this argument in
two ways. 43
 He pointed out first that while granting copyright
34
 Id. at 649, quoting W. Kerr, Injunctions 413 (5th Ed. 1914). The refusal of a court of
equity to protect immoral or indecent works should not be confused with the refusal of a court
in a copyright infringement action to protect such works because of the constitutional
requirement that copyrighted works promote the sciences and useful arts. See text at note 7
supra.
38
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). See M. Nimmer, Copyright 36, at 146.28-.29 (1973). See
also note 70 infra.
36
 46 F.2d 813 (W.D. Mich. 1931).
37 Id. at 814,
39
 Krauss v. Joseph R. Peebles Sons' Co., 58 F. 585 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1893). See text at
note 29 supra.
39
 Appeal of Pratt, 117 Pa. 401, 404, 11 A. 878, 881 (1888).
4° 58 F. at 595.
4 ' Id.
42
 486 F.2d at 1088 n.3. See Rogers, Copyright and Morals, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 390, 394
(1920); Note, 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 71, 84 (1959).
43
 486 F.2d at 1089 (dissenting opinion).
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protection to fraudulent material will assure that only one person
will defraud members of the public with a single fraudulent scheme,
rather than several defrauders using the same scheme, it will not
insure that any fewer members of the public will be defrauded." He
added further that in granting copyright protection to such material
the law is not only condoning fraud, but is placing its power,
endorsement and support behind fraudulent works." A third possi-
ble answer is that the public interest might well be served by
allowing as many copies of fraudulent schemes to be circulated since
it will increase the likelihood that someone defrauded by the scheme
will sue the author, or that the state Attorney General will decide to
prosecute under state criminal laws. 46 Thus, enforcement of the
clean hands doctrine against an infringement claimant may well
serve the public interest.
The clean hands defense often presents the court with the task
of reconciling two conflicting policies—the policy of preventing pi-
racy of copyrighted works and the policy of preventing unlawful use
of that monopoly. In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.'"
the court, in rejecting the antitrust defense to a copyright infringe-
ment action, formulated a balancing test to be used when such
conflicting policies come before the court in a copyright case. The
test includes taking into account the comparative guilt or innocence
of the parties, the moral character of their respective acts, the extent
of harm to the public interest, and the penalty inflicted on the
plaintiff if relief is denied." If the Belcher court had used this test
and determined that the copyright policy should prevail, its reason-
ing could have been supported." It may be argued, however, that
the harm to the public interest is greater in the case of fraud than in
the case of an antitrust violation. While the harm to the public at
large from lack of competition may be serious, the harm resulting
from fraud to individuals—the loss of specifically calculable
amounts of money as a result of reliance on a fraudulent scheme—is
arguably more serious and might outweigh the copyright policy
against piracy.
As the court in Belcher observed, there is scant authority on the
application of the clean hands doctrine to the precise question of
granting copyright protection to false and fraudulent material. Stone
44 Id. at 1090 (dissenting opinion),
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, 17535 (West 1964). However, since the
nature of the service provided by both plaintiff and defendant is one to aid in gambling, it
would be difficult to prove that the loss of money resulted from reliance on a fraudulent
system rather than on chance.
47 191 F,2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
48 Id. at 106.
° 9 The court seems highly skeptical of defendant's claim of fraud with respect to the first
five publications. 486 F.2d at 1088. Using the Bell test the court then could have concluded
that even if there was fraud it was not of such serious proportions or so detrimental to the
public interest as to overcome the copyright policy.
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& McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co. 5° was the one major case
where fraud was the reason for the denial of copyright protection
through equitable relief. Here the court held that a manual of
instruction in a system of salesmanship, consisting of a collection of
advertisements to be used by dealers in connection with the sales of
pianos, contained representations of fact which had a tendency to
mislead and deceive the public and that such material was also not a
proper subject for copyright." Althqugh the court held that the
material was not a proper subject for copyright, it went on to point
out that even if it were, the law should extend its protection only to
those advertisements that reflect the truth and avoid representations
which mislead and deceive the public. 52
The Stone case is an excellent example of the way the courts
have used the clean hands doctrine to protect the public interest in
copyright cases. 53 The Belcher court's rejection of it is also an
excellent example of its confusion of the clean hands doctrine and
the constitutional theory.
The Stone court used the broad clean hands principle, employ-
ing an analogy to a trademark case, Manhattan Medicine Co. v.
Wood. 54 The Manhattan Medicine case relied not only on the equity
maxim, but upon the argument heard in the immorality cases that
no property right inheres in a trademark which contains an assertion
that is false and that the right to exclusive use of such a trademark
cannot be protected. 55
 Since this was the prevailing theory with
respect to denial of copyright to offensive material, the Stone court
could have relied solely on this analysis. However, it went on to
note that there were strong policy reasons to act in equity, pointing
out that Louisiana had enacted state punitive legislation to prohibit
fraudulent advertising. 56
In applying the clean hands doctrine, the Stone court did not
engage in a serious inspection of the work in question with respect
to its merits or morality, nor did it invoke the lack of merit or
morality as the basis for its denial of relief. It merely applied the
equity principle to a set of facts. It did not inquire into the truth or
falsity of the views of the work; it inquired only into the conduct, of
the plaintiff according to the principles of equity through which the
plaintiff was seeking relief. Such an inquiry is far more limited than
5° 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915).
51
 Id. at 841, 843. Advertisements are now held to be a proper subject for copyright. 17
U.S.C. § 6 (1970).
52 220 F. at 843.
53
 But see Note, 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 71, 82 (1959), where the author suggested that Stone
is not a clean hands case because it did not meet the test of conduct detrimental to the
defendant.
54
 108 U.S. 218 (1883), cited in Stone, 220 F. at 841.
55
 108 U.S. at 223-24, quoting Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., 11
Eng. Rep. 1435 (Q.B. 1865).
56
 220 F. at 842. The same argument would apply to Belcher given the California state
law prohibiting false advertising. See note 46 supra.
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that engaged in by the courts where the constitutional theory is
used. Yet the Belcher court's rejection of Stone as unsound57 was
based on its erroneous belief that the court's inquiry in Stone was
the same as that required when courts have applied the constitu-
tional theory. While it may be argued that the clean hands doctrine
should not be applied in copyright cases, 58 it is unfortunate that the
Stone case and its application of the clean hands doctrine was
rejected by Belcher for reasons which do not inhere in its applica-
tion.
Another more recent case in which the question of the copy-
rightability of fraudulent material was presented was Advisers, Inc.
v. Wiesen
-Hart, Inc." The court in Belcher cited Advisers as contra
to the Stone holding. 6° While the court in Advisers did find that the
copyright in works which it found to be fraudulent was valid and
infringed," its reasoning with respect to damages provides support
for the argument that the congressional intent of the Copyright Act
was to exclude such material from its protection. In Advisers, the
court found that plaintiff's "CASH 100 Book" which contained dis-
count coupons for the purchase of jewelry were fraudulent because
they represented to the public that the book was worth one hundred
dollars when in fact the same discounts were given to everyone
regardless of the coupons. 62
 In so finding, the court refused to grant
the statutory award of one dollar per book in damages, but instead
granted damages in its discretion as allowed by the Copyright Act,
since it had found the copyright valid and infringed. 63
It might be argued that the Advisers court was making a
distinction between material which is the proper subject for
copyright and a copyrighted work which should not in equity be
granted the court's help in enforcing." This is supported by the
court's statements that cash books are properly copyrightable, but
that because of their fraudulent content, statutory damages could
" 486 F.2d at 1088.
" See text at notes 37-48 supra.
54
 161 F, Supp. 831 (S.D. Ohio 1958).
R0 486 F.2d at 1088, 1088 n.2.
61 161 F. Supp. at 834.
62 Id.
63
 Id. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970) authorizes a court to allow damages in the amounts
stated in the section ($1 for every infringing copy made or found in possession of the infringer
or his agents or employees). The Act also allows the court, in lieu of actual damages and
profits to award such damages as to the court shall appear just and in assessing such damages
the court has the discretion of allowing statutory damages or other damages within the limits
of the section. Id.
64
 The argument for making this distinction is a strong one. Without it, the courts and
the public would be faced with the situation where the Registrar of Copyrights becomes the
determiner of what is subject matter suitable for copyright. Although the Registrar is given
some discretion in determining what is copyrightable under the Copyright Act, that discretion
does not extend to content evaluation. See 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 395 (1958); Bouve v. Twentieth
Century Fox-Film Corp., 122 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1941). But see Vacheron & Constantin-
LeCoultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958).
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not be awarded. 65
 Since the court in Advisers did not mention either
the clean hands defense or the constitutional theory, its handling of
the case might be a valid compromise to those courts which wish to
work totally within the statutory framework. 66 The Advisers court
in effect reads the clean hands doctrine into the Copyright Act.
Despite the precedent of Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan
Piano Co. and the use of the clean hands doctrine as a potential
protector of the public interest, a court faced with the question of
whether fraudulent material should be copyrighted might reason-
ably reject the various theories upon which a denial of protection
could be based. Although fraudulent material does not promote the
sciences and useful arts, the constitutional theory might be rejected
for its involvement in the merits of a publication. The clean hands
doctrine, unless broadly construed, might be inapplicable because of
a failure of the parties to demonstrate specific harm to their
interests.° The statutory construction approach, although presum-
ably grounded in equitable principles, might be rejected because of
failure to find direct support for the supposed congressional intent in
the Copyright Act. 68
But even if all these theories are rejected, it seems that there is
a strong public policy argument, made applicable by the invocation
of a court's equity jurisdiction, against the court lending its protec-
tion to fraudulent work. The position of a court of law as an
instrument of justice is severely compromised when it lends its
support to illegal activity. If a state legislature has determined that
false and fraudulent advertising is against the law, a court neglects
65 161 F. Supp. at 834.
66 The statutory argument that the Copyright Act did not intend that fraudulent works
be copyrightable is referred to by Judge Wallace in his dissent in Belcher. 486 F.2d at 1089
n.1 (dissenting opinion). Since the Act states that injunctions should be granted only under
principles of equity, and principles of equity would not allow fraud to be protected, therefore
the Copyright Act would disallow such protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1970). The legislative
history supports this argument only to a limited extent. Section 112 of the present Copyright
Act was derived from 17 U.S.C. § 36 (1946 ed.) (Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 17 U.S.C.
§ 36, 35 Stat. 1084), where the original wording was: "Any court ... shall have power, upon
bill in equity filed by any party aggrieved" to grant an injunction. The law now reads "upon
complaint filed." 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1970). This change suggests that when the 1909 Act was
first passed, greater emphasis was placed on equity jurisdiction and its principles. Although
the court in Advisers does not explain where it finds congressional intent to disallow damages
for infringement of fraudulent works, since the present Act provides for "such damages as to
the court shall seem just," 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970), the Advisers court might have inter-
preted this language as further codification of equity principles and congressional intent that
those principles prevail when awarding damages. The argument is further supported by the
fact that injunctive relief, codified by the Copyright Act, is an equitable remedy and one
which is prevalent in copyright actions, therefore requiring that eqUitable principles be
ap plied.
" See, Note, The Misuse Defense in Copyright Actions, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 916, 926
(1962), where the author suggests that since courts are so insistent that the strict requirements
of the clean hands doctrine be present—offensive conduct be present in the action and that the
defendant be specially harmed—the doctrine usually turns into one of the other misuse
defenses.
65 See note 66 supra.
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its judicial responsibility when it acts even in indirect contraven-
tion of that law. 69
 Furthermore, although it is not the court's gen-
eral responsibility to be the keeper of public morality, it is the
court's equitable responsibility to determine, even in the limited
context of a copyright infringement action, what is and what is not
fraudulent. 7 ° A refusal to accept that responsibility is to allow illegal
conduct to continue, and, as is the case in Belcher, to continue with
the court's blessing:"
The court in Belcher, if it accepts the district court's finding of
fraud with respect to the sixth publication, 72 had a number of
alternative ways to determine whether or not such material should
be protected by copyright. Although its apparent confusion of the
constitutional theory with the clean hands doctrine clouded its
reasoning, its ultimate conclusion appears unsupportable and its
decision is one which compromises the integrity of the judicial
system.
JEAN S. PERWIN
Copyright—Photocopying as Fair Use--Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States.' —Plaintiff, Williams & Wilkins Company, a pub-
lisher of medical journals, brought a copyright infringement action
against the United States. 2 Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, through the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Library of
Medicine (NLM), infringed plaintiffs copyrights in four of its medi-
cal journals.
.	 The facts reveal that the government libraries had distributed
the articles free of charge and on a no-return basis. Nevertheless,
they generally enforced their self-imposed regulations of limiting
requests to fifty pages and to a single copy of a journal article. The
utilization of this regulated photocopying resulted in the yearly
69 See note 46 supra.
70 There seems to be a conflict of authority over whether the determination of fraud is
outside the scope of a copyright infringement action. Professor Nimmer states that since an
allegation of fraudulent content necessarily puts in issue facts extraneous to the work itself, it
seems proper to regard such facts as insufficient to constitute a defense in a copyright
infringement action even though it may constitute grounds for rendering the plaintiff liable in
a separate proceeding. M. Nimmer, Copyright § 36, at 146.29 (1973). However, deceptive
and misleading advertising is specifically listed as an affirmative defense to copyright infringe-
ment in 9 Am. Jur. Trials, Copyright Infringement Litigation § 78, at 383 (1965).
71 486 F.2d at 1090.
72 See note 49 supra.
1
 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct, Cl. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 2602 (1974).
2 Suit was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(6) (1970), which provides that in the
event of copyright infringement by the United States "the exclusive remedy of the owner of
such copyright shall be ... recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation as damages for
such infringement, including the minimum statutory damages . . . ." [Emphasis added.]
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